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1ALD-6 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-2271
___________
WILLIAM J. NEIDIG
v.
PETE RENDINA; LANCE THOMAS; JOHNIE, a/k/a Jonzie, Shamokin PD Unknowns
WILLIAM J. NEIDIG* and CHARLES NEIDIG, Jr.,
 Appellants
(Pursuant to F.R.A.P. 12(a))
*Dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. App. 3(a) and 3rd Cir. LAR 3.3 and Misc. 107.1(a)
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 07-cv-00036)
District Judge:  Honorable James F. McClure
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
October 9, 2008
Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES and JORDAN, Circuit Judges
Opinion filed: October 21, 2008
_________
OPINION
_________
2PER CURIAM
Charles Neidig, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denying his motion to intervene in a civil
rights action filed by his son, William Neidig.  We will affirm the District Court’s order,
but on different grounds than those relied upon by the District Court.  See Brumfield v.
Sanders, 232 F.3d 376, 379 n.2 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that an appellate court may affirm
the result reached by the district court on different reasons, as long as the record supports
the judgment).
William Neidig pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance. 
As part of the plea agreement, William Neidig agreed to forfeit certain property.  The
District Court entered a preliminary order of forfeiture and directed the government to
provide public notice of the forfeiture.  No claims were filed for the property, and the
District Court entered a final order of forfeiture.  Charles Neidig then filed a motion in
the criminal case for the return of certain seized property.  The District Court denied the
motion, but we vacated the District Court’s order and remanded the case for further
proceedings.  The District Court obtained counsel for Charles Neidig, and his motion was
denied.  Charles Neidig’s appeal of the denial of his motion for return of the property is
pending.
Shortly after we had remanded the case, William Neidig filed a civil rights
complaint against Postal Inspector Pete Rendina, Pennsylvania State Police Trooper
3Lance Thomas, Detective Robert John, and unknown defendants.  He alleged that the
defendants confiscated certain of his real and personal property before trial or the
forfeiture proceedings, that the property was not related to his drug activity, and that he
was deprived of proceeds from the real property, which could have been used for his
defense.  William Neidig requested a hearing and asked that the forfeiture proceedings be
stayed.  Charles Neidig moved to intervene in William’s action.
The District Court granted defendant Thomas’s motion to dismiss, concluding that
the complaint failed to allege his personal involvement.  The District Court later granted
defendant Rendina’s motion to dismiss.  The District Court explained that William Neidig
sought to recover property that he had agreed to forfeit as part of his plea agreement. 
Concluding that a judgment in William Neidig’s favor would necessarily imply the
invalidity of his conviction or sentence, the District Court held that the complaint must be
dismissed under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).  For the same reason,
the District Court dismissed Neidig’s claims against the remaining defendants.  
The District Court also denied Charles Neidig’s motion to intervene in the lawsuit
and his motion for appointment of counsel.  The District Court concluded that, in light of
William Neidig’s failure to state a claim, his action would not impair Charles Neidig’s
ability to protect any interest he might have in the property that was the subject of the
complaint.  The District Court also noted that Charles Neidig’s avenue of relief was to
file a claim in the criminal case, which he did with respect to one piece of property. 
     William Neidig’s appeal of the dismissal of the civil rights action was dismissed for1
failure to prosecute.  The fact that the civil rights action has been dismissed, however,
does not render Charles Neidig’s appeal of the denial of his motion to intervene in that
suit moot.  See DBSI/TRI IV Ltd. P’ship v. United States, 465 F.3d 1031, 1037 (9th Cir.
2006) (explaining that, if the appellant is successful, he will have standing to challenge
the dismissal of action in which he sought to intervene).
4
Charles Neidig appealed the denial of his motion to intervene and counsel motion.   1
A litigant seeking intervention as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
24(a)(2) must establish (1) a timely application for leave to intervene; (2) a sufficient
interest in the underlying litigation; (3) a threat that the interest will be impaired or
affected by the disposition of the underlying action; and (4) that the existing parties to the
action did not adequately represent the prospective intervenor’s interest.  Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Treesdale, 419 F.3d 216, 220 (3d Cir. 2005).
The District Court found that Charles Neidig did not satisfy the third requirement
of Rule 24 based on its determination that William’s underlying action lacked merit.  We
decline to address the merits of the underlying action, and affirm based on Charles
Neidig’s failure to establish in his motion that he satisfied the requirements of Rule 24. 
Although we traditionally have given pro se litigants greater leeway where they have not
followed the technical rules of pleading and procedure, Charles Neidig’s motion simply
asserts a claim to property that William asserted in the underlying action was improperly
taken by government officials.  He did not establish a threat that his interest will be
impaired or affected by the disposition of the underlying action, or that William did not
     We recognize that in the criminal proceedings Charles Neidig asserted in his motion2
for return of property that William had agreed to rent out certain property for him while
he was incarcerated, and that William had failed to do so.  It does not necessarily follow,
however, that William would not adequately represent Charles’s interest in an action
against the government.  Their interests would appear to be aligned.  Charles’s filings in
this case do not suggest that William would not adequately represent him. 
5
adequately represent his interest.  Thus, we find no error in the denial of the motion to
intervene.   2
We also conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Charles’s counsel motion.  See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993)
(requiring that it appear that a claim has some merit in fact and law before counsel will be
appointed).  Although Charles notes that we suggested that he be afforded counsel in the
criminal proceedings, our suggestion was based on the technical nature of state property
law related to the forfeiture proceedings.  See C.A. No. 06-1618, 11/7/07 Op. at 6 n.6.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order to the extent that it denied
Charles Neidig’s motions.    
